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NEW SHMAGENCY WORRIES
Olof Leffler
onstitutivism is the view that there are constitutive features of agen-
cy, actions, or propositional attitudes, actual or idealized, that explain 
normative phenomena, such as reasons, values, or moral norms.1 Con-
stitutivists also usually hold that something about these constitutive features can 
explain the normative force of the phenomena; because we act, are agents, or 
have certain propositional attitudes, we are ipso facto required to follow certain 
norms. While constitutivists disagree about which norms we are required to fol-
low, most have also argued that the constitutive features are inescapable, and 
that inescapability plays a vital role in the explanation of the normativity of these 
norms, as well as in replying to objections.2
But we may question how inescapable the norm-explaining features are. If 
we do not instantiate the constitutive features that explain norms, it seems like 
we can avoid the norms they are supposed to explain. In particular, we can avoid 
their normative force. Someone who is a shmagent—very much like an agent, 
but without instantiating the norm-explaining features—is very similar to an 
agent, but because the shmagent lacks the norm-explaining features, she is not 
subject to the norms.3 Hence, it seems like constitutivism is unable to explain 
the norms that apply to such creatures.
This problem is known as the agency-shmagency problem, or—as I call it—
the shmagency objection. My aim is to show that, despite many constitutivist 
responses, new versions of the problem appear for most forms of constitutivism; 
in particular, it remains a deep problem for those who attempt to explain practi-
cal reasons of normatively forceful varieties (cf. section 1, below, for details). This 
1 This characterization is rough, but it is enough for present purposes. Several possible explan-
atory relations seem acceptable here, e.g., grounding (assuming that grounding is, indeed, 
explanatory), constitution, reductive identification—or even less realist alternatives—so 
constitutivism allows for many interpretations.
2 Cf. Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Shmagency Challenge” and “Inescapability Revisited”; 
Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics; Korsgaard, Self-Constitution; Velleman, 
How We Get Along.
3 Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency” and “Shmagency Revisited.”
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means that the shmagency objection remains a significant problem for constitu-
tivism. If a form of constitutivism that attempts to explain normatively forceful 
practical reasons is to be viable, it will have to avoid the new shmagency worries.
To show this, in section 1, I present the original shmagency objection. In sec-
tion 2, I show how the standard reply to the objection—that the shmagent is 
self-defeating—seems defensible, despite several arguments to the contrary. But 
then, in section 3, I extend the shmagency objection by arguing that shmagents 
can be sophisticated enough to have practical reasons while standing outside 
agency. This resuscitates the problem. In section 4, I explain how sophisticated 
shmagency remains a problem for some other recent constitutivist attempts to 
avoid the shmagency objection. 
In section 5, I introduce another major line of response to the shmagency ob-
jection, according to which constitutivism is defended by appeal to constitutive 
features we are under normative pressure to have. I call this view partial constitu-
tivism. Partial constitutivists respond to the shmagency objection by taking our 
constitutions to be normatively justified, so it does not matter for their purpos-
es if we sometimes fail to live up to them. But in section 6, I argue that partial 
constitutivists suffer from a second new version of the objection, because they 
leave the normative phenomena they are supposed to explain underdetermined. 
I conclude in section 7.
1. Enoch’s Argument
The paradigmatic formulation of the shmagency objection comes from Enoch.4 
The basic point has often been set up using an example. Imagine that you are 
playing chess. There are certain rules (and maybe aims) constitutive of doing so; 
if you do not abide by them, you seem to be playing something else other than 
chess. Call this other game shmess. Why should you stick by the rules (or aims) 
of chess—rather than shmess—when you are deciding which game to play? A 
reason seems needed.
By analogy, Enoch thinks, it is unclear why we should care about what is con-
stitutive of action or agency. We can always ask “so what?” and demand a reason 
for why we should be agents rather than shmagents—something very much like 
agents, but not quite like agents. Or, to put the same point in a more poignant 
way, we can ask the shmagency question: “Why should I be an agent rather than 
a shmagent?” 
The question is meant to illustrate that we can avoid being agents by being 
shmagents instead. We can, so to speak, shirk from the normative requirements 
4 Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency.”
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that agency is supposed to commit us to. For if we are shmagents rather than 
agents, we can have all the features that we would take to be constitutive of agen-
cy—or even otherwise associated with it—except those that explain the norms 
that hold for us. 
But as constitutivists attempt to explain normative phenomena by the fea-
tures that are constitutive of agency (including their inescapability), then if we 
can be shmagents, it seems like their explanation does not get off the ground. If 
shmagency is an open option for us, then constitutivists have yet to explain nor-
mative phenomena well, for they have not explained the normative force of the 
phenomena.5 Therefore, when I mention the shmagency question below, I take 
its main point to be equivalent to suggesting that agency is not comprehensive 
enough to explain norms.6 
More formally, here is the problem: 
P1. If constitutivism is true, the conditions of agency that explain (nor-
matively forceful) practical reasons for us must be (descriptively) in-
escapable.
P2. We can (descriptively) escape instantiating the conditions of agency 
that explain (normatively forceful) practical reasons for us.
C. Constitutivism is false.
The core reasoning behind the different premises is already present in the de-
scription of the argument above. The thought behind P1 is that if we can escape 
the constitutive features of agency that explain norms, then we do not have 
an explanation of the phenomena these features are supposed to explain. The 
thought behind P2 is that we indeed can avoid instantiating the properties of 
agency that explain norms, for we can be shmagents, and then it is unclear why 
our reasons are normative for us. (Or, equivalently, we can ask the shmagency 
question.) The conclusion follows immediately.
Some clarifications are, however, needed before I proceed to discuss the ar-
gument. First, I have written “the conditions of agency that explain (normatively 
forceful) practical reasons.” What does that mean? Just what normative force 
involves is an extremely intricate question.7 For now, a negative characterization 
5 At least, this is the standard interpretation of the objection. Alternative interpretations (usu-
ally along with this one) are discussed by Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics; 
Paakkunainen, “Doing Away with the ‘Shmagency’ Objection to Constitutivism”; Rosati, 
“Agents and Shmagents”; and Smith, “The Magic of Constitutivism.”
6 This core point can be extended further with other plausible assumptions—e.g., if we need 
reasons to be agents, then plausibly those reasons may need to be external to agency, so con-
stitutivism cannot explain all reasons. But the expansion is secondary to the main objection.
7 Cf. Finlay, “Defining Normativity.”
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will do: a practical reason, pro tanto or overall, for an agent A to φ is normatively 
forceful iff the reason cannot legitimately be ignored because A arbitrarily de-
sires or wants something else than to φ.8 This means that the argument applies 
to all constitutivist views that attempt to give positive explanations of such prac-
tical reasons—not least of moral reasons.9 These are the forms of constitutivism 
most participants in the debate have focused on, and the ones I will have in mind 
when I write “constitutivism” below. 
I suspect that the shmagency objection mainly is a challenge for constitutiv-
ism about practical reasons of this kind. It has often been aimed at all forms of 
constitutivism, but it is not clear whether all forms of constitutivism are affected 
by it. For example, constitutivism about epistemic reasons, e.g., where reasons 
for belief are explained as truth-conducive considerations because truth is the 
aim of belief, need not be at fault. It is not obviously implausible to think that we 
do not have reasons for belief unless we have beliefs from the start. 
More examples of forms of constitutivism where shmagency seems unim-
portant can probably be provided. But how such forms of constitutivism may 
be affected by the shmagency objection is beyond the scope of this paper. If the 
reader thinks that her favorite form of constitutivism suffers from the shmagen-
cy objection even though it is not one about normatively forceful practical rea-
sons, she should feel free to reinterpret the rest of my discussion in her favored 
way. For now, I shall focus on constitutivism about normatively forceful practi-
cal reasons. 
Second, the notion of inescapability in the argument is fairly complex. The 
standard interpretation of inescapability is that it is some descriptive form of ne-
cessity, not normative necessity. In particular, I am explicit that the form of ines-
capability involved here is descriptive, because this assumption will be tweaked 
below. In sections 5 and on, I will discuss normative inescapability, according to 
8 This characterization is not intended to be comprehensive; much more can be said about 
normative force (or “prescriptivity,” “directivity,” “commendation,” or whichever term one 
prefers for this elusive phenomenon). The core point here is that, while it is highly unclear 
how normative force (or “prescriptivity,” “directivity,” “commendation,” etc.) should be 
characterized, a shared commitment of all plausible views about it is that one cannot ignore 
something that has such force just because one desires to do something else, or does not 
want to, if that desire or want is not forceful in itself (i.e., is “arbitrary”). If the desire or want 
lacks normative standing, then it has no normative force itself. Notably, this is why norma-
tive force cannot be treated as just outweighing opposing desires—outweighing implies 
that desires or wants, too, have force. But they need not.
9 E.g., Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics; Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 
and Self-Constitution; Smith, “Agents and Patients” and “The Magic of Constitutivism”; and 
Velleman, How We Get Along.
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which it is normatively desirable to be the kind of agents that can explain norms. 
But more about that later.
Instead, for now, assume that the kind of inescapability that is involved in the 
shmagency argument is dialectical inescapability.10 Dialectical inescapability is 
a descriptive form of inescapability, for it is something that an agent has, rather 
than one that she ought to have. Ferrero characterizes it as “the inescapability of 
rational agency in the sense of the closure of this agency under the exercise of its 
distinctive operation.”11 What is inescapable is the agency that an agent already 
has, and agency is inescapable because it is self-defeating to attempt to escape 
agency, as acting so as to escape it involves exercising one’s agency. This form 
of inescapability might possibly work to ward off the shmagency objection—I 
discuss the argument for thinking that it may do so in depth in section 2, below. 
Third and finally, all forms of constitutivism I discuss set out some (inescap-
able) feature(s) as a condition of agency, actions, or propositional attitudes. It 
is this feature (or these features) that explains normative phenomena. But, for 
simplicity, I will refer to all those possible norm-explaining features as “agency.”
2. Inescapability and Self-Defeat
The most common reply to the shmagency objection is to deny the argument for 
P2. We cannot, it is claimed, properly ask the shmagency question. This standard 
response comes from a dilemma based on a distinction between an internal and 
an external way to ask it. The question is internal if it is asked by someone who 
already is an agent, but external if it is asked by someone who is not. The inter-
nal question is largely unproblematic, for it is a normative question whether an 
agent ought to be an agent. Maybe one ought not to be an agent, but at least 
constitutivists can try to give reasons for or vindications of why one should be 
an agent as soon as one has come this far. And as long as one remains an agent, 
constitutivists can provide whatever positive explanation of practical reasons 
they want. 
However, according to the standard reply, the external question does not 
arise. The most important reason for thinking that it does not is that anyone 
asking the question already is an agent, so it is self-defeating to ask it. Asking the 
10 However, as Ferrero (“Inescapability Revisited”) points out, this kind of inescapability 
need not be the kind that many constitutivists think explains normativity, such as the one 
Korsgaard (Self-Constitution, 1–2) suggests when she says that agency is our “plight.” But 
whatever positively explains normativity is orthogonal to the present discussion.
11 Ferrero, “Inescapability Revisited,” 128.
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external shmagency question is still an action, and hence subject to the norms 
explained by agency. Hence, agency is (dialectically) inescapable. 
One version of this response, paradigmatically formulated by Ferrero, has 
generated most of the ensuing discussion.12 I will start off by defending this ar-
gument, and hence constitutivism, against some recent responses. However, in 
the next section, I shall point out a deeper problem posed by shmagency, hence 
criticizing P2 anyway.
According to Ferrero’s response, then, agency is dialectically inescapable in 
virtue of two properties.13 First, agency is the enterprise of the largest jurisdiction, 
so all actions fit within its scope. Playing chess and playing shmess are both ac-
tions, while a shmagent does not act in the same way as an agent. Second, agency 
is closed under reflection, meaning that reflecting on how to get out of agency, let 
alone actively trying to do so, still counts as acting. It is, admittedly, logically pos-
sible to opt out of agency, e.g., by committing suicide. But once one is an agent, 
one cannot deliberately avoid being an agent without exercising one’s agency. 
The key argument, then, is that because agency is the enterprise of the largest 
jurisdiction, and one cannot opt out of it in the same way that one could decide 
to play shmess rather than chess, there is no alternative to it once one is in the 
game. One cannot deliberately leave for something else without exercising it. 
Hence, it is self-defeating to ask the shmagency question for an agent. Agency is 
dialectically inescapable.
I will proceed by presenting three points that can be construed as replies 
to the charge that shmagency is self-defeating. First, Enoch provides two such 
considerations.14 Responding to an interpretation of Velleman, according to 
which Velleman considers it constitutive of agency to care about one’s constitu-
tive aim—so caring about it is inescapable, and this explains why we are subject 
to norms—Enoch writes:
What we are up against here is an especially problematic instance of [a 
naturalistic fallacy]. . . . I want to concede that agency is indeed naturally 
inescapable for us. But I also want to note . . . that such inescapability does 
not matter in our context. . . . For the move from “You inescapably φ” to 
12 Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Shmagency Challenge.” Cf. Ferrero, “Inescapability Revis-
ited”; Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics; Korsgaard, Self-Constitution; Rosati, 
“Agents and Shmagents”; and Velleman, How We Get Along.
13 Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Shmagency Challenge,” 308–9.
14 Enoch also presents several other, less related, points (“Shmagency Revisited”). For exam-
ple, he discusses the plausibility of the constitutive aims that constitutivists defend. But 
that has little to do with shmagency.
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“You should φ” is no better—not even the tiniest little bit—than the move 
from “You actually φ” to “You should φ.”15
The objection here is that constitutivism suffers from a version of the naturalistic 
fallacy. But the objection shifts the topic. It does not seem to have much to do 
with dialectical inescapability. As Ferrero points out, dialectical inescapability 
need not by itself be used to explain any norms. Because it is not the property to 
which constitutivists appeal to explain why a norm is normative, it is not subject 
to a naturalistic fallacy.16 Dialectical inescapability only shows why one cannot 
avoid agency once one is an agent. 
The positive explanation tends to be provided by some other inescapabili-
ty-related property, such as Korsgaard’s plight inescapability.17 On my inter-
pretation, according to plight inescapability, we cannot avoid being subject to 
norms because we keep being faced with new choice situations where we must 
act, so we must both continuously face the demands of agency and cannot ac-
tively leave it (as according to dialectical inescapability).18 But it is the former 
conjunct that explains how we keep being subject to the norms of agency. The 
naturalistic fallacy charge is aimed at the positive explanation that plight ines-
capability might provide, as is the talk about a move from “You actually φ” to 
“You should φ.”
Having said that, it could be argued that this response of Enoch’s still is a 
problem for constitutivists, because it shows that they have to say more to ex-
plain normativity. But that is a point that constitutivists happily may concede, 
and then go on to try to provide such an explanation, for example by appealing 
to plight inescapability—though whether they succeed is a different question. 
Regardless, naturalistic fallacies seem beside the point at the present stage of 
the shmagency dialectic; constitutivists are allowed to say that one cannot avoid 
agency and then supplement their explanation of normative phenomena with 
any explanans they want.
Enoch’s second response is that constitutivists turn the skeptic into an actual 
character that they try to convince. They try to show that the potential shmagent 
cannot get out of its predicament of being an agent. That means that they do not 
face the conceptual problem that the shmagency objection stems from. As he 
15 Enoch, “Shmagency Revisited,” 216, cf. 211.
16 Ferrero, “Inescapability Revisited.”
17 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 1–2.
18 Cf. note 10, above.
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puts it, the skeptic “is not . . . an actual character, with a position to defend, [but] 
the embodiment of a problem we face, because of our commitments.”19
The shmagency objection should instead be understood as a problem for our 
concept of agency. The challenge is that constitutivism does not show why we 
would have to be agents even if the shmagent is self-defeating because she asks 
the shmagency question. The self-defeat response would, in a way, be an ad ho-
minem charge of hypocrisy against the shmagent. But such hypocrisy is irrele-
vant—hypocrisy does not imply that our concept of agency is such that there is 
no question to ask about why one ought to be an agent. It only shows that the 
hypocrite is in a place where asking the shmagency question becomes hypocrit-
ical because she already is committed to being an agent. But whether she should 
be an agent is what is at issue.
To this point, Ferrero has replied by conceding that there is a sense in which 
he treats the shmagent as an actual character.20 But this does not matter. Here 
Ferrero relies, again, on the distinction between internal and external questions. 
The shmagent occupies a position external to agency and asks whether it should 
become an agent, but that position can be shown to be self-defeating (by the 
argument above). This leaves the internal question—why an agent should care 
about being an agent, rather than a shmagent—open. But the reply to the inter-
nal question is distinct from the dialectical inescapability of agency, which can 
defuse the external question. Again, constitutivists can respond to the internal 
question however they want. It is enough for them to avoid the external one.
A third reply to the inescapability worry comes from Tiffany.21 Tiffany ac-
cepts Ferrero’s point that the external question is self-defeating. However, he 
also holds that the kind of agency one cannot opt out of is too minimal to explain 
strong normative standards, such as those that normatively forceful reasons can 
provide us with. Hence, Tiffany thinks, some form of constitutivism may be true 
about some extremely weak norms, but not stronger norms.
The underlying reason for this is that he believes that constitutivists equiv-
ocate on the nature (or, possibly, concept) of agency. According to Tiffany, just 
because we cannot opt out of some weak form of agency, it does not follow that 
agents cannot opt out of substantive constitutivist-style agency that might ex-
plain norms. Maybe a minimal agent can be an agent in the sense, for example, 
that she is able to act for reasons. But constitutivists start off from substantive 
theories about agency that involve more than minimal agency. For example, 
Kantian constitutivists like Korsgaard think that agency requires a commitment 
19 Enoch, “Shmagency Revisited,” 219.
20 Ferrero, “Inescapability Revisited,” 131.
21 Tiffany, “Why Be an Agent?”
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to the categorical imperative.22 Yet the minimal agent need not be committed to 
anything that strong.
However, Tiffany’s equivocation response goes by too quickly. It seems to 
beg the question. Constitutivists often attempt to explain reasons in terms of 
some features of (presumably intentional) agency as such.23 This means that 
there is no weaker version of agency out there—or, at the very least, constitutiv-
ists can hold that there is only one type of relevant agency, whereas other forms 
(e.g., animal agency) are extremely different and hence need not have the same 
normative commitments.24 So constitutivist theories of agency differ from min-
imalist theories not by taking there to be different standards of agency for dif-
ferent (relevant) agents, but by claiming that agency involves much more than 
some weak standard like the ability to act for reasons from the start. If constitu-
tivists are right, it follows that every agent (or every normatively relevant agent) 
is committed to everything that agency involves. 
But might one not think that there are several forms of normatively relevant 
agency from the start, like Tiffany and others appear to do?25 Why would agency 
be unified so as to generate the same normative reasons for all? The option is, 
admittedly, theoretically open. But absent an argument in its favor, it still seems 
question-begging. Constitutivists can answer: Why should we believe that there 
is more than one kind of (normatively relevant) agency? More would have to be 
said to give constitutivists reason to go with a disunified account.
3. Normativity for Shmagents
I have just presented three lines of defense of the inescapability reply to the 
shmagency objection. There still seems to be a sense in which at least the stan-
dard kind of agency remains dialectically inescapable, and the skeptic therefore 
self-defeating. However, I shall now argue that P2 remains defensible. Even 
though the original shmagency question can be avoided, the objection can be 
extended in a way that makes the original problem remain. 
How so? The final response to the shmagency objection that I discussed and 
criticized was Tiffany’s equivocation response. Even though it begs the question, 
there is still something to his point that different ways of being might generate 
different normative results. We may well accept the constitutivist response to 
the shmagency question and make a deeper point that threatens P2.
22 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution.
23 Cf. Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics, 37–46.
24 Cf. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, chs. 3–7, and Fellow Creatures.
25 E.g., Lavin, “Forms of Rational Agency.”
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This is because insofar as we want to explain strong norms, such as norma-
tively forceful practical reasons, we need to know more than who is an agent. 
Regardless of what agency involves, as long as the constitutive feature(s) used 
to explain reasons is relatively complex—and all constitutivist views under dis-
cussion are in agreement here—constitutivists will have trouble giving a good 
enough explanation of the normative reasons that hold for many creatures that 
appear to have them. Some of them can stand outside agency and ask the shma-
gency question. So constitutivism does not seem to provide a good explanation 
of reasons because it cannot explain the reasons of some creatures who have 
them. Therefore, it lacks explanatory power even when construed as a theory 
about subsets of the reasons there are.
In particular, constitutivists cannot explain reasons for what I will call sophis-
ticated shmagents. Sophisticated shmagents appear to have reasons and stand 
outside agency, so such shmagents can ask the external shmagency question. 
This vindicates P2. (We can call the fact that they appear to have reasons, or at 
least something reasons-like, the problem of normativity for shmagents.)
But who are sophisticated shmagents? I stipulate that they are shmagents 
who are intelligent, knowledgeable, and perform what looks a lot like actions 
for what looks a lot like reasons—and, I shall argue, what well may be reasons.26 
They are also capable of (what looks like) deliberation, reflecting on what they 
do, and are able to prefer different actions to different extents. Accordingly, they 
seem like prima facie good candidates for participating in ordinary normative 
practices, such as that of giving reasons for their actions when asked why they 
are doing what they do. 
But sophisticated shmagents cannot act and are not agents according to con-
stitutivists. This is because they lack at least one—possibly all—of the consti-
tutive features of agency that constitutivists also use to explain reasons. Since 
constitutive features are necessary features, without them the sophisticated 
shmagents fail to qualify as agents. 
26 If one wants to use the word “reasons” conservatively, one can call what sophisticated shma-
gents have “shmeasons”—but they still seem to have exactly the same kind of role and force 
as reasons do for agents. So reasons and shmeasons are still equivalent. Hence, if we think 
more deeply about who the creatures that lack the reasons-explaining features are, it does 
not seem like they do not have reasons—instead, they seem to function surprisingly much 
like agents (who have reasons), so we have good reason to think that they do have reasons. 
In fact, we have no pre-theoretical reason to think that what they have should not be 
explained in the same way as the reasons of agents. And it would be fallacious to think 
that, just because constitutivists can explain reasons for agents by appeal to the constitutive 
features of agency, there are not some reasons for shmagents that they cannot explain. Just 
because constitutivists can explain one part of the normative sphere (for agents) does not 
mean that there is nothing more to it.
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We can concede to constitutivists that agency should be understood in their 
preferred ways; in fact, as I argued in response to Tiffany, we should do so, or else 
we beg the question against most constitutivists. But with that concession made, 
there remains a conceptual and normative space where sophisticated shmagents, 
characterized as above, can operate. And if they can do so, a problem re-emerges 
for constitutivism. Sophisticated shmagents can ask the external question about 
whether they should be agents, i.e., they can reason practically about whether or 
not they should be agents, since they have what appears to be reasons. However, 
being shmagents, they still stand outside agency—in other words, they are ex-
ternal to agency. So it seems like they can ask the external shmagency question.27
Moreover, they can do so independently of the dialectical inescapability of 
agency. To rehearse the last section: my responses to objections to Ferrero’s ar-
gument were (i) that the naturalistic fallacy point does not matter because the 
fallacy has little to do with dialectical inescapability, (ii) that it does not seem to 
matter that constitutivists reify the shmagent because they can still defuse the 
external question, and (iii) that because constitutivists think agency involves a 
lot from the start, it begs the question to hold that only minimal forms of agency 
are inescapable. 
Yet none of these responses indicate that there cannot be sophisticated shma-
gents. The responses can be avoided as follows: (i) the explanation of reasons 
in terms of agency is neither here nor there if we can escape agency, which so-
phisticated shmagents can; (ii) because sophisticated shmagents stand outside 
agency from the start, they can ask the external shmagency question; and (iii) 
sophisticated shmagents are shmagents, ex hypothesi, so they have little to do 
with what constitutivists take agency to involve.
I shall illustrate how such shmagents appear to have reasons while standing 
outside agency, vindicating P2, by discussing Korsgaard’s theory of agency. As-
sume that she is right about the nature of agency. She thinks that it entails that 
agency must be regulated by the categorical imperative (CI), because we need to 
unify ourselves to act, and that, she thinks, fundamentally involves being regu-
lated by CI. The core idea is that acting involves acting on maxims, these need to 
27 I suspect that sophisticated shmagency is a problem here because philosophers have fo-
cused too much on shmagency as an offshoot of agency. Shmagency is usually taken to be 
agency minus the normativity-explaining feature that agency purportedly has (and possibly 
minus something else, but only little else). Hence, one might become a shmagent if one 
loses some agency-constituting feature. But shmagents can be extremely cognitively and 
maybe even normatively sophisticated, in the manners just described, while standing out-
side constitutivist agency.
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be universalized, and universalization must proceed in line with CI. If not, we are 
mere heaps, not agents.28
But assume simultaneously that we have some sophisticated shmagents. Call 
them the Martians. A traditional Humean belief-desire theory is true about how 
the Martians behave or otherwise interact with their environment (rather than 
act, since only agents can act), intentionally or not, and that their ordinary be-
havior or interaction usually stems from belief-desire combinations of mental 
states. These are not in any way regulated by CI. There is no need to appeal to 
maxims, universalization, or being in line with CI to explain their behavior; such 
features, which Korsgaard takes to explain why we are bound by CI, are in no way 
part of their psychologies. Hence, they lack the norm-explaining features that 
she thinks are constitutive of agency.
Or consider some other sophisticated shmagents—the Saturnians—whose 
behavior or interaction stems from besires, i.e., mental states that both represent 
the world and push them to behave in certain ways. Again, they lack the features 
that might seem to bind us to CI. Examples of creatures with different kinds of 
psychological setups can be multiplied pretty much indefinitely here; they all 
lack the conditions that are constitutive of agency and constitutivists take to ex-
plain reasons.29 I focus on these two, however, as they exemplify psychologies 
that philosophers often have thought explain action.
The Martians and Saturnians fail to qualify as agents on the theories of agen-
cy that constitutivists like Korsgaard, who want to explain normatively forceful 
practical reasons, hold. There is, ex hypothesi, no way that their “actions” have 
the typical constitutivist aims. Again, maxims, universalization, or being in line 
with CI have nothing to do with the explanation of their behavior. It follows that 
they do not aim at following norms such as CI (in any relevant way, at least), and 
hence do not have reasons on Korsgaard’s view.
Yet they still appear to have reasons. They are sophisticated and are therefore, 
pre-theoretically, on par with at least humans insofar as reason-possession goes. 
I have already assumed that sophisticated shmagents have all kinds of properties 
that indicate that they have reasons: they are intelligent; are knowledgeable; per-
form what looks a lot like actions for what looks a lot like reasons; are capable of 
(what seems to be) deliberation and reflecting on what they do; and are able to 
28 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 72–80.
29 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that they may still be regulated by CI even though 
that is not their self-understanding. I do not deny that; I have not discussed self-understand-
ing. The point is rather that the features that might commit one to CI are not involved in 
their psychologies at all, and a lot of argument would be needed to show that belief-desire 
pairs require it.
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prefer different behaviors. And they seem to be prima facie good candidates for 
participating in normal normative practices.
Moreover, here is a number of things we take to be true about reasons. First, 
(i) they are facts counting in favor of something (for someone), so they would 
have to be reasons for someone. Furthermore, (ii) they appear to be normatively 
forceful (at least for those who have them), (iii) they depend (e.g., supervene 
on, or are grounded in) natural facts, (iv) they come in varying strengths (or 
weights), (v) they can contribute to generating all-things-considered reasons, 
and (vi) they have impact on deliberation.
All the properties that reasons are supposed to have seem possible to in-
stantiate without having a constitutivist-style constitution. For example: Let a 
Martian deliberate (or deliberate*, if you want to reserve the word “deliberation” 
for a kind of action that constitutivist-style agents perform). Let it also deliber-
ate using facts; its desires might be backgrounded.30 From its perspective when 
deliberating, it represents facts—which may or may not seem desired—when 
deliberating.
Using representations of these facts, the Martian judges which ones count in 
favor of what to do (i). It is these facts that appear, to the Martian, to be relevant 
to determine what it is to do by favoring different outcomes (ii).31 Moreover, the 
facts that it takes into consideration seem to stem from natural properties, e.g., if 
something is pleasant or painful for the Martian (iii).
Now, the Martian thinks these facts can matter to different degrees (iv), but 
weighs them up, and tries to reach a conclusion about what to do based on what 
it most strongly favors. Because it is knowledgeable and intelligent, it can do this 
to quite a significant extent. What appears to be reasons therefore comes in dif-
ferent strengths depending on how it weighs things up (v), and they have been 
part of generating what looks like an all-things-considered reason. The Martian, 
then, seems to be deliberating with reasons (vi). And all this could be said about 
the Saturnians as well. 
Again, it certainly seems like the Martians or Saturnians have reasons, or at 
least something that plays the role of reasons. Because these creatures stand out-
side constitutivist-style agency, there is a perspective from which it makes sense 
to ask the external question about whether they should be agents or shmagents. 
30 Cf. Pettit and Smith, “Backgrounding Desire.”
31 It might be thought that the “normative force” here is fairly weak—the only force I give the 
reasons here is that they seem relevant for determining what to do to the Martian. But the 
reader is free to slot in many possible theories about what it might consist in, as long as it is 
compatible with some facts seeming that way to the Martian.
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So we can preserve P2 in the original argument. So the shmagency objection 
stands.
Unsurprisingly, there are some worries about this defense of the shmagen-
cy objection. First, it might be claimed that it does not matter that there are 
shmagents who occupy a place outside agency from which they may ask the 
shmagency question. For one could hold that what matters is whether agency 
is inescapable for creatures like us, who already are agents. If it is, for example, 
psychologically impossible for us to have belief-desire psychologies or besires 
because we are the kinds of creatures who have Korsgaard-style constitutions, 
and these cannot be altered, becoming shmagents is not a live possibility for us.32 
It seems possible that we might not be able to become shmagents. I have 
defended the inescapability of agency for agents in section 2, and then tried to 
argue that the real shmagency problem comes from creatures like the Martians 
or Saturnians who never may have been agents in the first place. The shmagents 
may or may not ever have been agents. 
But because they still seem to have reasons, or something very much like 
reasons, that normative phenomenon should be explained in the same way that 
we explain reasons for ordinary agents.33 We should want a general explanation 
of (what looks like) normatively forceful practical reasons. But then, constitu-
tivism seems ill suited to explain a phenomenon like normatively forceful prac-
tical reasons if its explanation is limited to agents’ reasons and not the reasons 
of sophisticated shmagents—it only seems able to explain a subset of our obser-
vations of the reasons there are. So constitutivism does not seem very explanato-
rily powerful because it cannot handle all the reasons there are. Hence, it is likely 
false, even about reasons for ordinary human agents.
A second possible response is to say that the kind of reasons that shmagents 
have are somehow different from, and probably of less normative interest than, 
those that constitutivist-style agents have. Or, similarly, one might think that 
what I have called shmagents are agents of another kind than standard consti-
tutivist agents, and then argue that one should explain their reasons in different 
ways. 
Versions of this point are already made in the constitutivist literature. Most 
obviously, Lavin thinks there can be different kinds of agents who have different 
kinds of norms applying to them in virtue of having different kinds of constitu-
tions.34 Similarly, Korsgaard thinks that while humans indeed act in accordance 
with universalized principles—and our fundamental principle is CI—for ani-
32 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
33 Cf. note 26, above.
34 Lavin, “Forms of Rational Agency.”
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mals, instincts work as the right kind of principles.35 By distinguishing between 
different kinds of principles, we can make sense of different kinds of agency, and, 
possibly, different kinds of reasons that stem from different sources. 
But appealing to different kinds of reasons seems disingenuous insofar as we 
are talking about agents and shmagents instead of when we contrast, for example, 
human beings and animals. We can easily make further assumptions about the 
Martians and Saturnians that explain why it seems like they have reasons in the 
ordinary sense of the word. When I characterized them, I stipulated that they 
have all kinds of properties that make them seem to have reasons, and I have 
also showed how what looks like reasons might feature in their phenomenology. 
Examples of properties needed to have reasons in the ordinary sense of the word 
can be multiplied, since the Martians and Saturnians are creatures that we con-
struct. They can always be made sophisticated enough to seem to have reasons 
in the ordinary sense.
4. Other Reasons to Dismiss the External Question
I have now motivated the shmagency worry again. Sophisticated shmagents 
seem to have reasons and stand outside agency, so they can ask the external 
shmagency question. However, some other motivations than the self-defeat ar-
gument from section 2 have also been proposed for explaining why the external 
question fails to make sense. If either of these is right, P2 would be defended. I 
shall first discuss a semantic response, and then a metaphysical one.36 I shall 
argue that these responses, too, fail due to considerations that have appeared in 
the discussion in the previous section. The responses attempt to show that it is 
impossible to ask the external shmagency question, but sophisticated shmagents 
can do so. 
First, there is a second strand of argument in Velleman’s response to the 
35 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 3–7, and Fellow Creatures.
36 Some responses can be treated more quickly. O’Hagan (“Shmagents, Realism and Constitu-
tivism about Rational Norms”) seems to endorse both types of response, but she is not able 
to face the challenge for Tiffany from section 3. She tries to defend constitutivism by argu-
ing that shmagents must deny a minimal norm of reasons-responsiveness, but it does not 
follow from that norm that constitutivists must accept enough material to be able to explain 
normatively forceful practical reasons. Furthermore, Rosati (“Agents and Shmagents”) ar-
gues that the difference between agents and shmagents is greater than what Enoch has as-
sumed, but once we see that, we realize how much more valuable agency is to us. So agency 
matters because it is valuable. But, obviously, that requires her to have a take on values that 
is independent of what we can squeeze out of agency if it is to answer the skeptic. I discuss 
such responses in sections 5 and 6, below.
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shmagency objection.37 The idea is that the external question—asking “Should 
I be an agent or a shmagent?” from the perspective of a non-agent—does not 
make sense because it is semantically defective. It looks analogous to “Is a tree 
taller?” without specifying what the tree might be taller than. If so, it is concep-
tually impossible to ask the shmagency question, and so the possibility that we 
might end up outside agency is no challenge to constitutivism. 
However, as Enoch points out in his response to the argument, shmagen-
cy-style questions do not seem defective.38 Asking whether one should be an 
agent or something like it, or if one has reason to be an agent, seems perfectly 
intelligible. So, prima facie, shmagency-style questions do not seem defective. 
Yet seemings can be erroneous, so maybe we need a deeper reason to think 
that they are correct in this case. One such reason stems from the point that the 
intelligibility of the external question does not stand or fall with the possibili-
ty of shmagency for creatures who already are agents. If the external question 
is unintelligible, it would make no sense for sophisticated shmagents, standing 
outside agency but having reasons, to ask the shmagency question. But whether 
sophisticated shmagents should become agents or not clearly matters for them—
assuming some constitutivist view is right about the normative commitments 
and implications of agency, they would be subject to different norms if they were 
to become agents, which no doubt matters from their perspectives. This would 
not have made sense if the shmagency question had been conceptually confused. 
Hence, the external question does not seem semantically defective. 
Another attempt to motivate the failure of the external interpretation of the 
shmagency question comes from Silverstein.39 He thinks that it makes sense 
to ask it, but that it is ambiguous between the internal and external versions 
of the question. The internal question makes sense, but the external one does 
not. A shmagent—who is not an agent—would be asking for reasons for actions 
though she has none, but anyone asking the question is already an agent. So the 
external reading of the question begs the question against the constitutivist pic-
ture of normativity, according to which it is agency that explains why something 
is a reason: 
It is tempting to interpret the shmagent’s question as one about reasons 
for action: Do I have any reason to become an agent rather than a shma-
gent? But that cannot be right, for a shmagent is not in a position to per-
37 Or, better: Enoch (“Shmagency Revisited”) attributes it to Velleman. I am not fully sure 
whether Velleman himself actually endorses it.
38 Enoch, “Shmagency Revisited.”
39 Silverstein, “The Shmagency Question.”
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form actions. Only agents can act, and so only agents can be in the market 
for reasons for action.40
However, this answer is unsatisfactory due to the problem of normativity for 
shmagents. Sophisticated shmagents are still in the market for reasons (or some-
thing reasons-like) for action (or for something action-like), and the external 
question certainly seems intelligible for an intelligent being who does not count 
as an agent according to the strong constitutivist theories of agency. So again, 
the external shmagency question remains a live possibility. 
5. Partial Constitutivism
I have now argued that there are shmagents that plausibly have normative rea-
sons, and hence defended P2. Can constitutivists respond to the shmagency ob-
jection in a better way? A number of authors have recently defended views ac-
cording to which we—most directly—should be agents normatively, rather than 
descriptively. For example, Michael Bratman has argued that norms constitutive 
of planning agency are justified in virtue of their value for our self-governance.41 
And though she does not commit herself to constitutivism, Caroline Arruda has 
argued that the reason we ought to be full-fledged agents is not, as constitutivists 
have argued, that full-fledged agency is inescapable, but because it allows us to 
pursue other valuable projects that require exercising full-fledged agency.42 It 
seems easy enough to turn her point into an argument for a form of constitutiv-
ism saying that we ought to endorse norms constitutive of full-fledged agency 
because of their general value for us.
Most importantly, however, Michael Smith has formulated a new version 
of constitutivism that diverges from previous accounts in interesting ways.43 
Because this view is the most developed theory in print according to which a 
deeper norm allows us to explain reasons in a constitutivist way, I shall use it to 
exemplify the second response strategy to the shmagency objection.44
40 Silverstein, “The Shmagency Question,” 1136.
41 Bratman, “The Rational Dynamics of Planning Agency.”
42 Arruda, “Why Care about Being an Agent?”
43 Smith, e.g., “Agents and Patients,” “The Magic of Constitutivism,” and “Constitutivism.”
44 Beyond the three views just mentioned, the first hint of such a view is arguably in Bagnoli 
(Constructivism in Ethics, 11), though she does not develop the point in detail. Moreover, 
Paakkunainen (“Doing Away with the ‘Shmagency’ Objection to Constitutivism”) has re-
cently presented an interesting view in the vicinity of those I have in mind. Her response to 
the shmagency objection says that reasons can be grounded in features of agency that we 
need not instantiate. It does not seem committed to taking those features to be normatively 
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We can call the type of views mentioned above versions of partial consti-
tutivism. The core idea here is that the constitutive conditions of agency that 
are supposed to explain normative phenomena such as reasons are normatively 
defended themselves. So the kind of agency that explains some normative phe-
nomena is normatively justified from the start, but can still do explanatory work 
regarding other normative phenomena. Quite generally, we can characterize par-
tial constitutivism like this:
Partial Constitutivism: For all forms of constitutivism, a form of consti-
tutivism is a form of partial constitutivism iff the constitutive features of 
agency that explain normative phenomena are normatively justifiable (or 
desirable, required, etc.) to instantiate for someone, rather than only de-
scriptively necessary for one to instantiate to be a member of some kind.
I call partial constitutivism “partial” because, on this view, it is not the case that 
all norms are explained by constitutive features that an agent only descriptive-
ly instantiates. Instead, at least one norm is a deeper feature of the explanation, 
suggesting what type of agent one is justified in being. That type of agency be-
comes normatively, not descriptively, inescapable. This norm (or these norms) 
may or may not be further reducible to descriptive constitutivist or naturalistic 
terms—but whether it (or they) can is an open question that one need not take 
a stand on.45
Partial constitutivism stands in contrast with standard forms of constitutiv-
ism in at least two ways. First, it is in one sense normative rather than descrip-
tive. The constitutive features of agency by which some interesting normative 
phenomenon is explained are normatively justifiable (or desirable, required, 
etc.), and that is why one should instantiate them. They may or may not also be 
descriptively necessary for agency—one may have to live up to the standards 
of agency in some minimal sense to count as an agent at all. But then, those nor-
mative standards in turn impose stronger norms on an agent—e.g., to be a fully 
functional agent. Or, alternatively, it may be that there is some sort of external 
normative justification for being an agent of the relevant kind. 
By contrast, according to standard formulations of constitutivism, the con-
justifiable for us, so it differs slightly from the partial constitutivist solution to the problem 
that I will present—this solution is formulated in terms of a kind of normative inescapa-
bility. Nevertheless, her positive suggestion for how one might formulate a form of consti-
tutivism that avoids the shmagency objection still relies on a kind of attributivism about 
goodness, making it very similar to Smith’s view that I will present in detail—and, I think, 
susceptible to the problem I will raise for his type of view. I hope to discuss her suggestions 
in more detail elsewhere.
45 However, at least Smith (“Constitutivism”) believes that it is so reducible.
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stitutive norms are explained by non-idealized properties that constitute some-
thing as a member of their kind simpliciter. One must instantiate them to at least 
some extent to count as a member of some kind, but the constitutive conditions 
themselves need not put direct normative pressure on agents. Whether one 
should be an agent of some kind is a separate question from whether one is one.
Second, partial constitutivism is less comprehensive than many standard 
forms of constitutivism.46 It does not attempt to explain all practical norms or all 
moral norms, but rather uses some normative feature to explain agency, which in 
turn explains some other normative phenomenon, such as reasons. This might 
seem to make it less ambitious, and therefore less attractive, than the standard 
forms of constitutivism. But the view still does substantive work to explain some 
normative phenomena (e.g., reasons) in terms of others (e.g., perfectly good 
agency), and so remains informative.
As mentioned, partial constitutivism can be exemplified using Smith’s view. 
What Smith has done is to start to label his older ideal advisor theory of reasons 
a form of constitutivism.47 On his present view, our reasons for action are ex-
plained by having their sources in the desires of our ideal counterparts, where 
our ideal counterparts are perfectly good qua agents. Agency is taken to be a 
goodness-fixing kind, i.e., a kind that itself sets out the features that something 
has to have to be a good member of it. Moreover, a perfect exemplar of an agent, 
Smith thinks, is fully practically and theoretically rational, and rationality is 
spelled out in terms of coherence.
To explain reasons, then, Smith appeals to a prior conception of goodness 
for an agent. The goodness here is functional; a perfectly coherent agent is a 
perfectly functioning agent. Furthermore, Smith thinks that functional good-
ness should be understood in terms of features that are constitutive of agency.48 
Again, as mentioned, it does not matter for theoretical purposes whether the 
functional goodness here is constitutivist, as long as one can get to the explana-
tion of reasons in terms of the responses of perfectly functioning agents. That 
is still what Smith gives us: one can explain reasons in terms of the desires of 
perfectly functioning, or perfectly rationally coherent, agents, where that type of 
functional perfection is understood independently of our reasons.
So Smith is a partial constitutivist. He takes fully functioning agency to be 
able to explain normative reasons, and it is good for us to be such agents be-
46 E.g., Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity.
47 E.g., Smith, The Moral Problem, ch. 5; cf. Smith, “Constitutivism.”
48 Smith thinks that this is a form of constitutivist explanation too, taking any explanation of 
something normative in terms of the constitutive features of that thing to be constitutivist 
(“Constitutivism”). 
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cause agency is a goodness-fixing kind. Doing so, he—like other partial consti-
tutivists—is able to deny premise P1 rather than P2 in the original shmagency 
argument. For according to partial constitutivists, it is irrelevant whether or not 
actual agents are ideal. Their reasons can be explained regardless, for the kind 
of agency that explains norms is not descriptively inescapable, but normatively 
inescapable—on Smith’s view, this is because it is good to be a perfectly func-
tioning agent. Importantly, it does not even matter whether the reasons that one 
attempts to explain are the reasons of a member of some kind of entity that does 
not instantiate agency. Even the reasons of Martians or Saturnians can quite pos-
sibly be explained by the responses of idealized agents.
Hence, on a partial constitutivist view, it is possible to explain normatively 
forceful practical reasons without requiring the agency in terms of which they 
are explained to be descriptively instantiated—it is idealized agency that explains 
reasons, not actual agency. On this view, questions about whether we should be 
agents or shmagents are first-order normative questions about which reasons 
we have, but the reasons themselves have a deeper explanation.49 So partial con-
stitutivists seem able to explain at least some normative phenomena without 
invoking the argument against P2 discussed in the previous sections.
6. Shmagency as Underdetermination
Unfortunately, partial constitutivism lends itself to another version of the shma-
gency objection. In sections 3 and 4, I defended P2 in the shmagency argument. 
The external shmagency question still stands if constitutivists cannot explain 
shmagents’ reasons. But I just argued that partial constitutivists can deny P1, for 
we need not be ideal agents descriptively, only normatively, and ideal agency 
remains the same regardless of who we are, descriptively. 
However, a normatively analogous version of P2 remains. This is a problem 
of underdetermination: the reasons that are explained by some form of justifi-
able (or desirable, required, etc.) agency do not seem normatively preferable to 
other, slightly different, potential reasons that can be explained by treating the 
same justified (or desirable, required, etc.) agency somewhat differently. There 
seems to be little reason to prefer one explanation of reasons in virtue of nor-
matively justified agency to other such explanations, for the reasons that are to 
be explained in such terms can be given different interpretations depending on 
the extent or manner in which we should treat such agency. And there are many 
possible ways of baking the same normatively justified form of agency into our 
49 Smith, “The Magic of Constitutivism.”
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reasons, immediately yielding many possible candidate theories that might ex-
plain our reasons.
This problem exists because it is unclear how we should treat the normative-
ly sanctioned form of agency that explains reasons. For, very plausibly, there 
are different ways to respond to the same normative feature that it might have, 
which gives rise to different possible sets of reasons that are explained by forms 
of agency with it. For example, if the normative feature is some form of good-
ness or value, we can ask: Ought the goodness or value of agency be maximized, 
satisficed, used to explain only some subset of our reasons, respected, honored, 
promoted, or something else? Until we have an answer to this question, we can 
always ask: “Why should I care about what an ideal advisor tells me rather than 
what a shmideal advisor tells me?” where the difference between an ideal and a 
shmideal agent is that we treat their goodness or value differently.
We can also exemplify this problem using Smith’s view. Why should we be 
concerned with any of the alleged reasons that the desires of our ideal coun-
terparts supposedly grant us in virtue of functioning perfectly? There is, on his 
view, some sense in which it would be good to be fully functioning agents, and 
still good—but possibly less good—to be slightly less perfect as an agent. But 
no reason is provided for thinking that we ought to care more about reasons that 
have their sources in the desires of a perfectly functioning agent than a slightly 
less perfectly functioning agent. Being the latter type of agent may not be as at-
tributively good for us as the former, but their responses may still be what gives 
us reasons. So until we know what to do with the value of agency, it seems like 
it is not just ideal agents, but also less than ideal agents, that have desires that 
seem decent candidates for giving us reasons. This gives rise to the shmagency 
question: Why should we care about what an ideal advisor rather than a shmid-
eal advisor desires?
This type of problematic underdetermination appears in several places in 
Smith’s framework. One form stems from the possibility of a satisficing concep-
tion of how we should handle the value of agency. It is possible that someone 
seeking advice would be happy with advice from an agent who is good enough 
rather than from one who is ideal. We are free to attribute functional perfection 
to all kinds of things without for that reason thinking that we are somehow nor-
matively required to care about having the best versions—if a perfectly sharp 
knife is an ideal knife, I do not need a perfectly sharp knife to cut myself a piece 
of bread, just one that does the job. Similarly, a merely good enough agent might 
have desires that are good enough to count as the sources of reasons. We need 
something more to think that perfect functioning is required to provide reasons.
Second, there does not seem to be any reason to pick out Smith’s ideal advi-
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sors rather than several other advisors even if we aim for perfect advice. A less 
than fully coherent, yet still idealized, version of me might have desires for lasa-
gna (L), mac and cheese (M), and spaghetti carbonara (S), but desire lasagna 
over mac and cheese (L > M), mac and cheese over spaghetti carbonara (M > S), 
and spaghetti carbonara over lasagna (S > L). These desires are intransitive, and 
therefore incoherent. But that version of me might also always desire spaghet-
ti Bolognese over any of the other dishes, leaving the intransitive desires moot, 
because—assuming, in this case, that my reasons vary with the strength of my 
desires—I will always have more reason to cook spaghetti Bolognese rather than 
any of the other dishes. It is not obvious that we ought to prefer Smith’s view to 
this one when it comes to accounting for the reasons we have.
There are potential replies here. Smith thinks that the desires of ideal agents 
grant us reasons because they are authoritative, unlike other desires.50 They are 
preferable to the desires of less than ideal agents for two reasons. First, he thinks, 
we tend to find out what we have reason to do by deliberating. Second, the ex-
tension of what we have reason to do is well captured by what we would be mo-
tivated to do if we deliberated well.51
It is unclear how these points have bearing on the underdetermination worry, 
however. We may well find out what we have reason to do by deliberating well 
enough, and the extension of what we have reason to do may well be fixed by 
what we are motivated to do if we reason well enough. So the satisficing worry 
stands. Similarly, intransitivities among desires we do not actively consider need 
not trouble our deliberation in practice, and hence the extension of what we 
have reason to do may well be compatible with cases such as the pasta case. It is 
very plausible that even an ideal version of me would not even consider making 
lasagna.
Another potential reply is that we might want to do more normative thinking 
prior to going constitutivist. Then we can, maybe, settle how we ought to treat 
the value of agency in terms of which we explain reasons, and then go on to de-
fend some form of constitutivism based on the kind of agency we believe to be 
valuable for that reason.
50 Smith, “Constitutivism.”
51 An anonymous reviewer has suggested two other lines of defense for Smith, but neither 
is very helpful. First, it does not help to say that fully functional or coherent agency is the 
best form of agency, and hence what we should care about. Again, it may be that we should 
satisfice, or maybe we could aim for perfect advice about some limited subset of questions 
rather than all, or something else insofar as we are trying to account for reasons. Nor does it 
help to suggest that Smith’s ideal advisors have desires that are close to ours and hence are 
not alienated, because the desires of shmideal agents can be just as close—or possibly even 
closer, as they may share some of our flaws.
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I admit that this strategy seems open, but the reply essentially concedes the 
problem. We need to explain how to handle the goodness of agency to avoid 
the underdetermination worry. There is more work to do to explain what we are 
supposed to do with the value of agency before we can explain things in terms of 
it. This task need not be impossible, but it seems very hard. And partial consti-
tutivism is an incomplete view until we know how to treat valuable agency, and 
therefore which norms it is supposed to explain.
7. Conclusion
What have we learned? In section 1, I presented the shmagency objection, and 
in section 2 I showed that the standard line of defense—self-defeatingness—
seems to hold against criticism. But then I argued, in sections 3 and 4, that the 
shmagency objection remains because there is still an external standpoint, occu-
pied by sophisticated shmagents, that constitutivists cannot handle. After that, 
in section 5, I argued that partial constitutivists can defend themselves against 
the argument by denying P1 rather than P2. But in section 6, I argued that this 
response fails due to another shmagency objection stemming from underdeter-
mination.
From this discussion, one might conclude that constitutivism (about nor-
matively forceful practical reasons, at least) still fails in virtue of the shmagency 
objection. But that conclusion seems hasty. There may still be versions of con-
stitutivism that can avoid the sophisticated shmagents, and that are not based 
on underdetermined values. But just how such versions might look is better dis-
cussed elsewhere. My main conclusion is, instead, that constitutivists will need 
to avoid the challenges presented above to still be able to explain normatively 
forceful practical reasons.52
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